From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from atuin.qyliss.net (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by atuin.qyliss.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id C87A5D289; Thu, 02 Jul 2026 23:17:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: by atuin.qyliss.net (Postfix, from userid 993) id 42E60D1FD; Thu, 02 Jul 2026 23:16:58 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 4.0.1 (2024-03-26) on atuin.qyliss.net X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.8 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU,DMARC_PASS,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW,SPF_HELO_PASS autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=4.0.1 Received: from mail-24421.protonmail.ch (mail-24421.protonmail.ch [109.224.244.21]) by atuin.qyliss.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CD622D1F9 for ; Thu, 02 Jul 2026 23:16:56 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=colbyt.com; s=protonmail; t=1783034215; x=1783293415; bh=gmrKBy1jGBVZ4T06xdzT5+qG21O5C+FOhjvcOVYYVzg=; h=Date:To:From:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: Feedback-ID:From:To:Cc:Date:Subject:Reply-To:Feedback-ID: Message-ID:BIMI-Selector; b=dwbipfGj0SmkLQYTCqKnxgPdGJJcXWP3j112dX7HkALcBWmqGDp7F2eo5aGisMDk8 /FsoHYjrk4efok5W19v9URW6/vTk1+1AvYbmTLAW4AtW83Q+76uLNPgomK5VLsTyFo ZECBp47hlMk3pBhYxhJyFPQk5AorRLi6VR7kIkUsbwPLE11ClyvhtCWuH0UIEk6on6 RymOYoK3GRmx/UEHQGBeak+Jc0Ixr/JXKFlqSeDp0EM3wu6Oehp0lbviUtMSr4Dwck kGGMt3rjHQYgoTAgKcwsB1tu5Z/PxFhn2i8ePx0TVLMJJTQSu7a/3qcNCMlLN3PwQ/ HE0gVEWcx18Yw== Date: Thu, 02 Jul 2026 23:16:50 +0000 To: Alyssa Ross From: colby@colbyt.com Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/5] vm: boot sub-VMs from dm-verity roots and enable IPE Message-ID: In-Reply-To: <878q7twlps.fsf@alyssa.is> References: <20260625202013.1417254-1-colby@colbyt.com> <87cxxdz633.fsf@alyssa.is> <878q7twlps.fsf@alyssa.is> Feedback-ID: 70977973:user:proton X-Pm-Message-ID: 872cdaf15bc9ffedfb0c8557d5d4e0835175ea5d MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-ID-Hash: X5UDBZ37TTNBYZDN6LX74RCTXBKIB4CP X-Message-ID-Hash: X5UDBZ37TTNBYZDN6LX74RCTXBKIB4CP X-MailFrom: colby@colbyt.com X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; loop; banned-address; header-match-devel.spectrum-os.org-0; header-match-devel.spectrum-os.org-1; header-match-devel.spectrum-os.org-2; header-match-devel.spectrum-os.org-3; header-match-devel.spectrum-os.org-4; emergency; member-moderation; nonmember-moderation; administrivia; implicit-dest; max-recipients; max-size; news-moderation; no-subject; digests; suspicious-header CC: devel@spectrum-os.org X-Mailman-Version: 3.3.10 Precedence: list List-Id: Patches and low-level development discussion Archived-At: List-Archive: List-Help: List-Owner: List-Post: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: So instinctively the path I took there was to do IPE on apple end to end fr= om host to VM in an accountability chain, but not sure of the validity of m= y taste there -- I just like treating internal assumptions as hostile inste= ad of trusted -- I was hoping to achieve an inter-vm attestation system whi= ch would use things like this, but tbh did not think deeply. On Thursday, July 2nd, 2026 at 7:22 AM, Alyssa Ross wrote: > colby@colbyt.com writes: >=20 > > Yes this is me laying the groundwork for/ trying to solve=20 > > > > "Look into Integrity Policy Enhancement LSM > > Apparently this enforces that executables must be authenticated by dm-v= erity. Could we use this?" > > > > I may have forgotten to push all the files but I got it implemented and= working --- only I did not want to push actual IPE policies in a patch, as= that has a substantial possibility to break things. >=20 > Ah, yes. I meant IPE on the host when I wrote that. I'll update the > text to make that clearer. I don't immediately see any value in IPE in > VMs. >=20 > > On Friday, June 26th, 2026 at 8:15 AM, Alyssa Ross wrote= : > > > >> colbyt writes: > >>=20 > >> > This series changes the app VM and net VM root images to boot throug= h > >> > dm-verity, then enables IPE kernel support for the sub-VMs and the > >> > Spectrum host rootfs. > >> > > >> > Each sub-VM disk now has a verity metadata partition and an EROFS ro= ot > >> > partition. The build installs the root hash next to the disk image,= and > >> > the VM boot paths pass that hash to a shared initramfs. The initram= fs > >> > uses the hash to find both partitions, opens /dev/mapper/root-verity= , and > >> > switches into it read-only. > >> > > >> > The last two patches only enable kernel support for IPE. They do no= t > >> > install an IPE policy. With the existing generated kernel config, > >> > enabling SECURITY_IPE also enables the dm-verity root-hash provider,= so > >> > later policy work can match files from verified roots. > >>=20 > >> Would you mind explaining your motivation / the direction you envisage > >> here in a bit more detail? Given that the VM gets its root file syste= m > >> and the corresponding verity hash from the same place (the host file > >> system), there's no immediate security benefit from using dm-verity, > >> right? Is the idea rather to enable some sort of cool IPE thing for > >> which dm-verity is a requirement, but that's not implemented yet as pa= rt > >> of this series? > >>=20 > >> (I really appreciate the quality of your patches BTW =E2=80=94 you've = obviously > >> gone to some effort to identify and follow all the tiny little > >> conventions we have in the codebase. Thank you!) > >>=20 >