From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from atuin.qyliss.net (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by atuin.qyliss.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3435FB04D; Fri, 26 Jun 2026 19:12:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: by atuin.qyliss.net (Postfix, from userid 993) id 29883B0A5; Fri, 26 Jun 2026 19:12:33 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 4.0.1 (2024-03-26) on atuin.qyliss.net X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.8 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU,DMARC_PASS,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW,RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H4, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL,SPF_HELO_PASS autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=4.0.1 Received: from mail-4320.protonmail.ch (mail-4320.protonmail.ch [185.70.43.20]) by atuin.qyliss.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 27D2FB0A4 for ; Fri, 26 Jun 2026 19:12:32 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=colbyt.com; s=protonmail; t=1782501151; x=1782760351; bh=EGfJ/avpjQOsRe8EgmmsZI75zlv8FXu6wDXiuS8Xi9s=; h=Date:To:From:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: Feedback-ID:From:To:Cc:Date:Subject:Reply-To:Feedback-ID: Message-ID:BIMI-Selector; b=LYpOXc24p6UsHAUsr++M5T/CIS/UBSvHWXtsV8o9Zw45BHP0LMtz1JecPq88K3eee sX5dPYCq4UOX/w0JT7UpyqEVkmpMnc7trp+o2VcgXK6lzUH0w+PYtx/7Nf3g+c/yc3 FSKY6o1tAtHjr4GITe7wz1zPhoKrXeSmlcsyH+IZNf87fYLxuH02OvlT6xpRVwNPVi vALb0EGkQVyXN7w3IhJubRGT73o6NrC6q85+nmWOW8lI7HgX+ZYqHsKKI0sUtSMzY6 GWiWddaq4vN8Z/G1GpwhpngtzK5lHzHVVS+YnNw2LavVyHki0RJZqLVGA9IVtigOW4 hDI7i991npVdg== Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 19:12:28 +0000 To: Alyssa Ross From: colby@colbyt.com Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/5] vm: boot sub-VMs from dm-verity roots and enable IPE Message-ID: In-Reply-To: <87cxxdz633.fsf@alyssa.is> References: <20260625202013.1417254-1-colby@colbyt.com> <87cxxdz633.fsf@alyssa.is> Feedback-ID: 70977973:user:proton X-Pm-Message-ID: 0ac053bce5ff2669b8ec1b30881f7389d4d9eba5 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-ID-Hash: XO7IEFPWGZIPBT3M6IQXOCRTXUGAY7IS X-Message-ID-Hash: XO7IEFPWGZIPBT3M6IQXOCRTXUGAY7IS X-MailFrom: colby@colbyt.com X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; loop; banned-address; header-match-devel.spectrum-os.org-0; header-match-devel.spectrum-os.org-1; header-match-devel.spectrum-os.org-2; header-match-devel.spectrum-os.org-3; header-match-devel.spectrum-os.org-4; emergency; member-moderation; nonmember-moderation; administrivia; implicit-dest; max-recipients; max-size; news-moderation; no-subject; digests; suspicious-header CC: devel@spectrum-os.org X-Mailman-Version: 3.3.10 Precedence: list List-Id: Patches and low-level development discussion Archived-At: List-Archive: List-Help: List-Owner: List-Post: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Yes this is me laying the groundwork for/ trying to solve=20 "Look into Integrity Policy Enhancement LSM Apparently this enforces that executables must be authenticated by dm-verit= y. Could we use this?" I may have forgotten to push all the files but I got it implemented and wor= king --- only I did not want to push actual IPE policies in a patch, as tha= t has a substantial possibility to break things. On Friday, June 26th, 2026 at 8:15 AM, Alyssa Ross wrote: > colbyt writes: >=20 > > This series changes the app VM and net VM root images to boot through > > dm-verity, then enables IPE kernel support for the sub-VMs and the > > Spectrum host rootfs. > > > > Each sub-VM disk now has a verity metadata partition and an EROFS root > > partition. The build installs the root hash next to the disk image, an= d > > the VM boot paths pass that hash to a shared initramfs. The initramfs > > uses the hash to find both partitions, opens /dev/mapper/root-verity, a= nd > > switches into it read-only. > > > > The last two patches only enable kernel support for IPE. They do not > > install an IPE policy. With the existing generated kernel config, > > enabling SECURITY_IPE also enables the dm-verity root-hash provider, so > > later policy work can match files from verified roots. >=20 > Would you mind explaining your motivation / the direction you envisage > here in a bit more detail? Given that the VM gets its root file system > and the corresponding verity hash from the same place (the host file > system), there's no immediate security benefit from using dm-verity, > right? Is the idea rather to enable some sort of cool IPE thing for > which dm-verity is a requirement, but that's not implemented yet as part > of this series? >=20 > (I really appreciate the quality of your patches BTW =E2=80=94 you've obv= iously > gone to some effort to identify and follow all the tiny little > conventions we have in the codebase. Thank you!) >